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Abstract: 
This paper outlines the importance of labor mobility for the improvement in allocating 
and distributing economic resources. We are faced with an increasing lack of skilled 
workers and a growing tendency of unemployment amongst the low-skilled. A central 
political objective for the future will not only be education policy but also the recruitment 
of high-skilled workers from international and European labor markets. Additional skilled 
labor increases well-being and reduces inequality. However, internal European barriers 
to mobility are difficult to break through. An improved transparency of the European 
labor market, a greater command of languages and a standardization of the social 
security system can strengthen mobility. The key to mobility is in promoting the 
integration of international workers in the European migration process, which can be 
strengthened through circular migration. The European “blue card” initiative and the 
opening of labor markets to foreign graduates who have been trained in Europe could 
set a new course. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A globalized world and looming demographic shifts call for rapid adjustment of open 
economies. Due to the current global economic crisis European labor markets require 
new stimuli to avoid further economic decline, growing risk aversion or negative attitudes 
toward immigration. At the same time, demographic change presents nearly all of the old 
EU states with great challenges: ageing populations, scarcity of skilled labor, innovation 
deficits, and financial risks in social security systems. Growth, well-being, employment 
and social security are dependent on whether our reaction to the new challenges faced 
is flexible and innovative. At first glance, this will put particular demands on the factor 
labor, which as a provider of human capital acts as the main resource of a knowledge 
based society. Exchange rates and foreign trade policy have lost their significance as 
instruments of economic flexibility as a consequence of the euro zone and European 
integration. This has reinforced the importance of flexible labor markets. Past European 
stagnation has disciplined the manner in which wages are set, and the reality is that 
labor markets have become more flexible. Both real and human capital have also been 
more firmly embedded at the local level. In the long term, a lack of skilled labor will be 
the bottle-neck to expansion in developed economic regions. Human capital absorption 
through education and mobility policy is a key element to the future objectives of the 
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Demographic Change 2005-2020 
Share of Working Age Population Will Decrease Across the EU 
 
 
Source: Bonin et al. (2008) Geographic Mobility in the European Union: Optimising its Economic 
and Social Benefits. IZA Research Report No. 19 (Expertise for the European Commission) 
 




























Share of Total Population in 2020
-0,06 -0,04 -0,02 0 0,02 0,04
 Development 2005 - 2020  4
There is no indication that labor force mobility has increased in Europe. Current barriers 
in the form of e.g. non-transparent markets, the absence of cross-border recognition of 
professional qualifications and the non-transferability of social entitlements prevent not 
only mobility but also lead to potentially negative effects: As a consequence of these 
out-of-time restrictions, employment often occurs beneath the real level of qualification. 
Although the European Commission has already taken efforts and should continue to 
address obstacles in the field of coordination of national social security regimes, and 
transparency of qualification, the scope of intra-EU mobility in cushioning demographic 
ageing appears limited. Given that the share of old people relative to the working age 
population will increase inevitably, the demand for immigrants will increase especially 
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Demographic Change 2005-2020 
Share of Old People Relative to Working Age Population Will Increase 
 
 
Source: Bonin et al. (2008) Geographic Mobility in the European Union: Optimising its Economic 
and Social Benefits. IZA Research Report No. 19 (Expertise for the European Commission) 
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At the same time, the depiction of an inflexible Europe characterizes its own self-image 
and the image it projects to the outside world. Despite contrary efforts by the EU 
Commission for a European “blue card”, the EU still views itself as a fortress and not a 
migrant region. Therefore, it is not surprising that non-European migrants in Europe face 
mobility difficulties, and that the best skilled flock to the typical immigration countries of 
the USA, Canada and Australia. EU enlargement to the south and east has not brought 
about any fundamental changes. However, some key member states, like Germany and 
Austria, still hold on to the idea that Europe is a fortress. Ultimately, mobility both local 
and regional is still approached cautiously. 
 
What are the empirical findings and causes for the immobility of the European working 
population? Is there an economic rationality behind this behavior? What will be the 
effects on well-being and distribution, and how will this affect concepts in policy which 
governs the economy, society and labor? We approach these issues in the following 
manner: first, we explain the economic framework for the effects of mobility on allocation 
and distribution i.e. well-being and equality. Then, we summarize what we already know 
about regional and international mobility in Europe. We conclude with recommendations 
for a European mobility policy. 
 
2. Allocation and distribution of well-being and equality 
 
The migration of labor is typically associated with allocative, distributive and external 
effects (Zimmermann, 2005a). They generally contribute to a better employment of 
economic resources leading to increased production and greater well-being. One often   7
speaks of an improvement in allocation or an increase in social efficiency. Immigrants 
are especially useful in rapidly reducing imbalances brought on by the inability of native 
production factors to quickly adjust. However, the changes in the structure of production 
factors caused by this new labor also lead to a redistribution of the wages. Capital 
typically profits, while certain workers lose out. This can often result in conflicts 
regarding the distribution if unions are not prepared to accept a drop in wages as a 
result of immigration or less scope for wage increases. Immigrants can also stabilize 
social security systems with their financial contributions. They may also generate 
problems arising from unemployment, dependants who have come with them, or the 
increased burden placed on public services. Therefore, the parameters need to be kept 
in mind when evaluating the opportunities and risks of a migration policy. Overall, 
Europe has too little mobility and not too much. 
 
 This has been investigated in many studies, among them Obstfeld/Peri (1998) and Faini 
et al. (1997). However, this immobility can also have positive sides (Zimmermann, 
2005a). Internal and regional mobility of companies can replace interregional and 
international migration if firm or regional specific human capital plays a significant role. 
This human capital is lost when moving jobs, and it has to be rebuilt with the new 
employer. Employees typically value immobility: it enables them to form stable bonds in 
their social networks. Ultimately, every economy and society has to find its own balance 
between the utility from flexibility and its cost. Mobility can also be substituted with 
working at home or the internet. However, the process of moving work away from the 
office and to the house is proving to be difficult. Where this has taken place, however, 
has led to the same consequences as found with normal migration.   8
 
The effects of immigration on the native economy depend on the structure of the initial 
conditions and the composition of the immigrants (Bauer/Zimmermann, 1997; 
Kahanec/Zimmermann, 2009a). On the one side, the educational background of the 
immigrant plays an important role; on the other is the labor market situation of the 
receiving country. In a small open economy like Austria, flexible capital markets keep the 
level of interest rates constant when faced with immigration. If we at first turn to the 
situation of an homogenous labor market with full employment, then production 
increases with the employment of new workers. The wages of the native worker fall, and 
capital profits by the same amount the native work loses. Nevertheless, an expansion in 
production leads to a migration profit: were we to deduct the costs of the non-native 
labor force from the value of the additional production, we would yield an economic gain. 
 
This example highlights the source of possible conflict between capital and labor in the 
discussion regarding immigration. This is all the more apparent when the labor market is 
clearly characterized by unemployment, and hence, exhibits an imbalance. Thus, 
unemployment would worsen with migration: in the worst case scenario, it would 
correspond directly with the number of immigrants. However, the competition caused by 
the immigration can also dismantle the rigid structure, loosen union minimum wages, 
raise mobility and improve the labor market situation. Even the economic lessons 
learned due to immigration tend to be positive. That can be easily explained considering 
immigrants often accept jobs which natives refuse to do or are not able to do because of 
a lack of qualifications. However, there is no assurance of this: social or political 
consequences may result from the possible economic upheaval. These considerations   9
frequently lead politicians to the implicit or explicit conclusion that immigration needs to 
be limited and controlled. 
 
If realistic parameters are set, a completely different estimation can be arrived at. One 
such factor is that labor can be divided into trained and untrained workers (skilled and 
unskilled). Furthermore, the labor market for unskilled workers exhibits a surplus when 
the wages are too high; whereas the labor market for high-skilled workers is more 
characterized by a shortage. The three production factors of capital, skilled and unskilled 
labor are typically complementary: increasing one of the factors makes both the others 
more productive and results in better pay equilibria. If the shortage of skilled labor were 
to be eliminated, the wages of skilled labor would be lower and the employment rates of 
unskilled higher. Their wages may also increase as they become relatively scarcer. 
 
In this situation, an influx of skilled labor is not only unproblematic but urgently required: 
the economic efficiency in the factor capital would rise with an increase in profits, and 
unskilled workers would also see their income rise while wages of the skilled would be 
moderaded. As a consequence, there would be a reduction in inequality. 
(Kahanec/Zimmermann, 2009a show this in detail, both theoretically and empirically.) 
Therefore, qualified migration can lead to both more equality and better welfare. 
Conversely, the migration of unskilled labor is highly problematic because it raises 
unemployment and inequality. 
 
Let us examine the flow of skilled labor more closely. If skilled labor has reached or is 
close to a labor market equilibrium, additional skilled labor may result in a drop in wages   10
with the complete absorption of the immigrants into employment. Thereby, unskilled 
workers become relatively scarcer; thus, they are in greater demand. This reduces their 
level of unemployment and reinforces a tendency towards higher wages. In turn, the 
increased employment of unskilled workers leads to a relative shortage of skilled labor. 
Therefore, the demand for skilled labor and their wages rise; this rise, however, tends to 
be lower than the previous drop. As a final consequence, unskilled employment and 
wages rise, whereas the aggregate wages of native skilled workers fall. The result is a 
reduction in the inequality between unskilled and native skilled workers. 
 
3. Migration and mobility 
 
Since many parameters are changing globally, sustained growth, prosperity, 
employment and social security can only be safeguarded through a flexible market and 
the promotion of mobility. Labor migration leads to better deployment of economic 
resources and increases production. According to economic models, labor migration 
reacts strongly to differences in regional welfare (Zimmermann, 2005b; 
Bauer/Zimmermann, 1998). Differences in the following factors play a role: income, 
unemployment, cost of living, the availability of public goods and other state transfers. In 
contrast to this are the costs of change which arise, for example, not only through 
monetary costs from moving house or a loss of income in the transfer period, but also 
psychological costs which are incurred when a family is separated or other social 
networks in the country of origin are broken. According to the human capital model, the 
probability of older people migrating is lower than that of younger people, whose 
expected utility from the migration life-cycle is higher. Individuals with a better education   11
are more likely to migrate because they can not only expect a higher income, but they 
are also better at weighing up the risks of migration. They have at their disposal a 
greater ability of gathering and processing the relevant information. The risks and costs 
of migration typically grow with the distance from the destination country: information 
about distant labor markets is harder to obtain. Moreover, migrants circulate within 
familiar and ethnic networks. This leads to familiar and ethnic clusters of migration and 
the settling in the host country. The potential information transfer gained from this 
reduces the risks and costs for the migrant, thereby raising mobility. 
 
The much criticized inflexibility of both national and European labor markets has a 
multitude of micro- and macroeconomic reasons. The rise in female participation in the 
work force results in double income households and makes the question of mobility 
more complex; therefore, a move is less probable. Recent years have shown the 
following causes for the persistently weak labor mobility: the increase in home 
ownership; limited transferability of social security systems; too little recognition of formal 
qualifications; a lack of innovation in Europe; a fall in available jobs due to low economic 
growth; the ageing of the working population; and an absence of transparency of 
European online employment exchanges. Faster trains and cheaper flights have an 
ambivalent effect: they can encourage a change of job to a more distant region, make 
commuting easier and promote a supra-regional presence without changing 
employment. Increasing unemployment has made the attachment to local ethnic and 
social networks all the stronger. Furthermore, poor language skills and cultural 
differences present the greatest hurdles to geographic mobility in Europe. 
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If mobility in Europe is to be measured and analyzed, a series of problems will be 
encountered: mobility is low, therefore hard to measure; macro-data on migration in the 
European Union is incomplete and contradictory; the international migration process can 
only be observed in segments at the micro-level; and who has migrated is complied in 
the statistics of the receiving country, whereas the reference population is to be found in 
the data collection of the sending country. There is also a shortage of transnational 
surveys. Many statistics treat foreigners as migrants, neglecting their nationality, but 
include those belonging to the second generation with a foreign passport. Micro-
economic migration studies readily fall back on individually compiled migration plans, 
which, admittedly, can overestimate the actual migration. 
 
Despite these difficulties, Bonin et al (2008) were able to provide concrete data on 
European mobility. For European Union (EU) countries before eastward enlargement 
(known as the EU-15 countries), the share of active working age foreign-born (EU-27 or 
non-EU-27) is around 12.9%. The corresponding share for the new EU-12 member 
states is about 6%. As a comparison, about 18% of the labor force in Canada is foreign-
born; 23% in Australia; and 18% in the US. Cross-border mobility in the EU-15 with 
regards to the population of the receiving country is 0.1% annually; whereas regional 
mobility is 1%.  
 
Mobility rates and regional labor market performance are related: EU member states 
with higher rates of internal mobility experience smaller regional imbalances e.g. in 
unemployment rates. This indicates that increased geographic mobility could help to 
reduce regional imbalances on labor markets within the EU.    13
 
Additional data on mobile EU-27 citizens reveal low rates for all member states except 
for Luxembourg, Ireland, Portugal and Cyprus. The cross-border mobility rate for 
Germany and Austria is below 2%. 
 
Share of Citizens Living in Another Country  
Relative to the Population of the Country of Citizenship (2006): 
Low Rates Across the EU 
 
Source: Bonin et al. (2008) Geographic Mobility in the European Union: Optimising its Economic 
and Social Benefits. IZA Research Report No. 19 (Expertise for the European Commission) 
 
 
Over the past 10 years about 10% of EU-15 citizens have moved temporarily or 
permanently to live in another country. This share decreases with age while increasing 
with better education. More than 30% of the citizens who have moved to another country 
are still living there, whereas the population share of high frequency movers is very 









% 13.3 9.6 8.2 7.4 7.2 5.3 3.4 2.9 2.7 2.6 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.4
CY LU IE PT MT   RO  BG FI SK BE SI LT LV PL DE NL FR DK EE SE CZ IT UK ES EL HU AT  14
 
Interestingly, job-related factors no longer seem to be the predominant factors 
influencing the decision to move in the EU-15, while almost 85% of the citizens in the 
new member states mention work and income as the core motivation for a potential 
move. 
 
Factors Influencing the Decision to Move (2007 Data): 










Percentage of respondents mentioning a certain factor. Regarding the reasons of the last move, job-related reasons comprise “found 
a new job”, “did not have a job but looked for a new one”, “were transferred by employer”; education-related reasons comprise “went 
to study, train, or learn a new language abroad”; family related reasons comprise “accompanying partner or family”, “went to be with 
family already living in new country” and “change in relationship/marital status.” Regarding factors encouraging future mobility, work 
and income related factors comprise “to have a higher household income”, “to have better working conditions”, “to have shorter 
commuting time”; social network related factors comprise “to be closer to family and friends”, “to meet new people” and “receive 
better support from family and friends”; environment related factors comprise “better local environment and amenities”, “better 
housing conditions”, “discover a new environment” and “better weather”; public facilities related factors comprise “better health care”, 
“access to better schools”, “better public transport”. Respondents are allowed more than one answer.  
 
Source: Bonin et al. (2008) Geographic Mobility in the European Union: Optimising its Economic 
and Social Benefits. IZA Research Report No. 19 (Expertise for the European Commission) 
 
Following the two stages of enlargement eastwards, which occurred in May 2004 and 
January 2007, it was especially Germany and Austria who decided to keep their doors 
closed for a transitional period. This was a reaction in defense of unemployment and the 
  EU15 NMS12 EU27
Job-Related 40.5 58.6 42.3
Education-Related 14.7 12.2 14.5
Family-Related 32.2 16.6 30.6
Other 12.6 12.6 12.6
Work and Income 47.9 84.7 58.7
Social Network 52.8 37.3 48.3
Housing and Local Environment 71.2 57.0 67.1
Public Facilities 17.2 18.2 17.5
Reasons for Past Move
Factors Encouraging Future Move  15
feared “welfare tourism”. However, considerable inflows of labor migrants could be 
witnessed coming from the new member states to all European countries, with large 
numbers of migrants from Poland (for Germany, see Brenke/Zimmermann, 2007). 
Research, however, has concentrated on Sweden, the UK and Ireland.  
 
Free Movement of Labor After EU Enlargement 2004 










Notes: Harmonized monthly unemployment rates 1/2004 – 1-3/2007 (seasonally adjusted) 
Source: Eurostat 
 
These three countries had already dispensed with entry restrictions at the first phase of 
eastern enlargement. As shown by Zaiceva/Zimmermann (2008), who summarized the 
hitherto research results for these countries, no negative effects for the labor market nor 
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4. Economic policy implications 
 
To overcome the problems of lacking mobility in the EU labor markets, the EU has to 
follow a double strategy. First, initiatives have to be taken to mobilize the domestic 
market. Mutual recognition of professional qualifications and the full and transparent 
portability of social entitlements are not the only steps that should belong to the political 
agenda. The creation of a European online job exchange platform through a cross-
linking of national agencies may help to stimulate mobility as well as a Europeanization 
of education policy programs. Obligatory stays abroad in the educational sector and a 
strong promotion of exchange programs will certainly be effective. 
 
Secondly, while immobility can also be partially overcome through virtual networks and 
by providing extensive access to telecommuting, an active control of immigration is 
crucial to overcome the negative effects of restricted mobility. Thus, current barriers to 
freedom of movement for workers in the new EU member states must be abolished. A 
number of studies have shown that the positive outcomes of free movement of labor 
clearly outweigh any negative effects (Kahanec/Zimmermann, 2009b). 
 
In the concept of the EU, free capital and product markets promote the integration of the 
European economic zone and deliver growth and well-being (Zimmermann, 2005a). The 
greatest can be expected from unrestricted labor migration, whereby initial adjustment 
costs cannot be ruled out from the outset. However, labor market integration and a 
controlled opening for skilled labor from abroad is only hesitantly gaining ground. But 
time is running out. Under the current economic depression, labor migration might   17
collapse, with detrimental long-term implications. The upcoming demographic 
contraction and ageing of the European labor force contrasts with the growing demand 
for skilled labor and the increased displacement of unskilled labor from production 
processes. This requires a greater internal flexibility of the labor forces within Europe 
and a rapid establishment of the EU as a migration destination for skilled international 
labor. 
 
The world is facing a growing shortage of skilled labor, which will strike every economic 
nation in the long term and end in a battle for the most talented. Europe is not the first 
choice for the majority of highly qualified migrants. Since the EU has so far lacked a 
coherent common policy strategy for an active regulation of migration, it is not well 
positioned for the tasks ahead, but instead faces the danger of watching this on the 
side-lines, since the environment for labor migration has to be cultivated over time. 
Migration takes place in networks and builds up social infrastructures of people from 
diverse ethnicities. These networks need to be continuously invested into in view of the 
long-term, which is shown by the traditional migration countries. Otherwise, Europe will 
fall behind. It is not only the traditional policy of “Fortress Europe” which has outlived 
itself, but also the hesitant policies of making the labor markets more accessible, 
especially from the governments of Germany and Austria, following the latest European 
enlargements. 
 
The EU commission has since then recognized and advocated more mobility within 
Europe proposing a “blue card” for highly qualified skilled workers. This would turn 
Europe into a continent of migration. Criteria for the allocation of “blue cards” should be   18
(i) a particular professional qualification; (ii) a contract with a business based in the EU; 
and (iii) an income of at least three times the level of the national minimum wage. If 
these criteria are fulfilled, the highly qualified worker should receive a work permit and 
residence visa. The “blue card” is supposed to enable the holder to work within the 
entire EU economic zone. This would open the possibility of strengthening cross-border 
mobility within Europe, which would otherwise be too difficult to achieve. This process 
could generate circular migration among international labor, which would help reduce 
regional shortages in the labor market. The path to European migration policy would 
then be open. National migration policies are not only superfluous in an open economic 
zone but dangerous. In light of the recent European history of migration policy, however, 
it is hardly a surprise that governments in Berlin and Vienna have voiced the loudest 
objections to the “blue card”. Of course, this initiative will only become compelling, once 
workers’ freedom of movement is achieved. 
 
The economic contribution from immigrants can rise considerably with economic 
oriented migration policy (Zimmermann et al, 2007; Zimmermann, 2005a). Migration can 
be managed with the help of flexible and adjustable quotas for certain migration groups, 
and a selection system based on the personal characteristics of the immigrant (age, 
education, work experience, language skills, etc.). This would provide a larger economic 
welfare effect and increase immigrants’ integration skills without other migration reforms 
having to be modified. Economic-minded migration policy along the line of the “promote 
and challenge“ principle can make the process more transparent, the public discussion 
more objective and create a basis for a broader acceptance of immigrants. 
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A selection process makes little sense if there is no guideline on the maximum number 
of permits issued. The setting for this level is for the politicians’ responsibility. In the 
process, attention to both the long-term demographic trends and an effective 
determination of actual migration required are essential. The drop in population due to 
demographic changes and an ageing society make a steady migration of suitable groups 
sensible. However, the current labor requirements cannot be adequately covered by 
permanent immigration in cases of economic fluctuations or short-term demand bottle-
necks, because these circumstances require a speedy and tailored response. This asks 
too much of the public authorities’ ability to plan ahead and the responsiveness of 
migrants focused on the long-term. 
 
Different short and long-term variations in demand require a correspondingly diverse 
reaction in policy in the form of a dual strategy. Permanent migration can be 
systematically regulated with a “points system” according to international proven models. 
Points are awarded with priority given to criteria like age, educational achievement, work 
experience or the presence of a job offer. From an integration perspective, previous 
stays and the presence of family in the receiving country should be weighted, along with 
whether they have come with children and how proficient their language skills are. In 
addition to this, appropriate integration offers would be made available, which would 
form the basis of a contract between the immigrant and the receiving country. 
 
The most intelligent form of long-term migration policy lies in the education of qualified 
students who can stay in the country after their university degree if they find a job. 
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One the other hand, different factors need to be taken into consideration with temporary 
workers entering the country. Up until now, immigrants have entered the country rather 
randomly. The task which remains is to allow the entry of immigrants to selected 
segments in the labor market where there is a shortage of labor. Particular forms of 
temporary immigration should not be taken into account, for example workers of 
multinational companies or scientists, because there is no serious justification in state 
intervention. The actual required amount of immigrants could be “automatically” 
achieved by use of an auction, where a limited number of work permits and entry visas 
would be auctioned to interested companies. The market would react to this supply, and 
the activity of companies would indicate where the labor shortages are. A company 
would only take part in such an auction if the expected profit from employing an 
immigrant was greater than the costs of the auction and the search for personnel. This 
would only be the case if local labor supply could not meet demand. Such a method 
would be clearly superior to other conceivable options (fee-based scheme or levels at 
the discretion of government) because of the careful matching up of demand analysis 
and demand satiation. Furthermore, it would provide policy-makers with valuable 
information about current personnel bottle-necks, which could not be immediately 
tackled with education policy. The generated revenues from the auction could also be 
given to the education system. 
 
In general, migration should be seen as a chance for new economic dynamism: Europe 
shall be better placed as a competitor for diminishing human capital. At the same time, 
imbalances due to maladaption of native workers can be partially compensated through 
migration. Furthermore, migration of skilled workers produces greater social equality,   21
since the complementarity of high and low qualified workers provides employment and 
income advantages of the low qualified. To secure these positive effects, uncontrolled 




Despite opposing factors like multiple occupations within families, internet jobs or firm-
specific human capital, the worldwide shortage of skilled workers and the importance of 
mobility for the acquisition and distribution of human capital have risen sharply. Hence, 
labor mobility is of crucial importance. Mobility contributes to an optimal allocation of 
economic resources that generates high output and welfare. In addition, mobility 
ensures a quick adjustment of labor markets, especially on the regional level. However, 
the rapid increase in the demand for skilled labor cannot be satisfied by EU natives only, 
even if mobility barriers could be overcome. The push and pull factors on the migration 
behavior of labor forces will once more gain importance. Specially qualified immigrants 
(skilled workers) are typically a considerable help in raising the welfare and distribution 
of the receiving country. More and more EU unskilled workes will remain unemployed 
unless more non-EU skilled immigrants help generate jobs for them. Even with an 
unchanged quantity of migration, the quality can and must clearly be raised. Therefore, 
economic immigration policy is absolutely necessary for future economic growth within 
the EU. Selective immigration is a key component of a sustainable European welfare 
policy. Europe needs open labor markets; an active migration policy with the help of a 
point system and the “blue card”; an absence of regional restrictions, also for non-EU 
immigrants; an active mobility policy within the EU; and intensified efforts towards   22
intercultural integration, which guarantees the preservation of ethnic diversity and the 
ethnic capital of immigrants. The governments of Germany and Austria in particular 
should begin to scale down their reservations towards an open labor market. 
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